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STANDARD OF REVIEW
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT THE PILOT FEE CHARGED BY THE CITY OF
POCATELLO DID NOT CONSTITUTE A TAKING
BECAUSE THE PAYMENT OF MONEY DOES NOT
AMOUNT TO A COMPENSABLE PRIVATE PROPERTY
INTEREST UNDER THE TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Under the appropriate takings analysis, the PILOT component
of the user fee cannot constitute a taking because the payment
of money is not a compensable property interest.. ......................................................... 9
Appellants' attempt to skirt around the proper takings analysis
fails because Respondent does have the authority to collect user
fees with respect to water and sewer usage and Appellants' analysis
is inapposite to the matter at hand ............................................................................... .11
C. Appellants' attempt to distinguish a tax from a fee and whether
payment was made under protest is irrelevant as it confuses the
proper takings analysis with an inapplicable statute of limitations
12

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS'
STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS BECAUSE RESPONDENT HAS
IMMUNITY, WHERE THERE WAS NO DISPUTED MATERIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN ARGUMENT
RESPONDENT
ACTED WITH MALICE AND RECKLESS, WILFUL,
WANTON CONDUCT

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - ii

15

DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED
FROJ\.1
PERSPECTIVES lfND DID NOT
DISREGARD EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE EFFECTS UPON
APPELLANTS
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT,
WHERE THE MOTION WAS UNTIMELY AND WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE UNDUE DELAY
ATTORNEY
CONCLUSION
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wanton conduct.
determining

3.

4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' motion to amend
complaint
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

this appeal, Hill-Vu Mobile Horne Park and Ed Quinn seek review from the Idaho
Supreme Court after the district court dismissed their claims for damages and equitable
their initial complaint, Appellants alleged three causes of action relating to the

of

water and sewer user fees: ( 1) unconstitutional taking under both the Idaho and
unjust
tolling.
Course of Proceedings

Appellants filed

initial complaint

damages related to Respondent's
(R.

Bannock

] , pp. 1

Case No. CV-2011-0005228-0C

matter on
and use

1
certain water

requesting an
sewer user
adjudicated state

1, pp. 1

case

on

user
.)
court issued its

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's lvfotion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration on November 15, 2013. (R

Supp.,

842.) In

order, the district court specifically concluded that the City had prevailed on a number of issues.
Specifically, the district court concluded as follows:
1.

3.

City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed.
The imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are
not unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act
There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to
fund future capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act
Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer
program with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on
equity program, the
declares that the City is imposing an impermissible
tax to the extent that connection and user fees are being assessed a
fee
general fund purposes, and such practices must cease and are hereby
enjoined because they are unconstitufional and a violation of the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act. This means that connection and user fees must be
adjusted to the extent that they include a charge for the PILOT fee. In
addition, no PILOT fee transfers
water or sewer account to the
general fund are permitted.
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred
from the water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any
appropriate process, however named, for the purpose of paying extJenses
related to the operation, maintenance, replacement, and depreciation

existing water and sewer systems, including only those general City expenses
needed to operate the water and sewer departments, such as HR, financial,
legal and accounting, such transfers are permitted and are not hereby enjoined.
(R. Resp. Supp., p. 868.)
Because the PILOT component was determined to be impermissible in part, Appellants
initiated the present case seeking an award of damages to recover money paid to the PILOT
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2

a

court

oral

court then requested additional briefing
providing

1

on

on

the parties.

to

1,

2015, Appellants also filed a

district court with additional briefing, on

their motion on

motion for leave to amend their complaint to add additional -,-,.,.. -

July 10, 2015. (R. Vol. I, p. 658.) On August 17, 2015, the district court heard oral argument on
all pending motions and took the matters under advisement (R. Vol. 1, p. 7.)
Ultimately, the district court granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment and
denied Appellants' motion for leave to amend their complaint. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 700-732.) On
November I 0, 2015, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and
Denying Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to
Judgment,

First Amended Complaint along
1,

Appellants' claims.

motion for reconsideration on November 24, 2015,

Appellants

a
a

motion was denied. (R. Vol. 1, pp.

735-736; pp. 785-793.)
Lastly, on March 22, 201

Appellants
l,

challenge of the district court's summary judgment

802-

805.)

Statement of Facts
The City

Pocatello

for

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

of

owns

or

1,

a water
wastewater treatment

sewer

areas

serves

sewer systems,

are two
(R. Vol. 1,

on a monthly basis to

user of the water and sewer system

bythe

the

(R.

Vol.1,p.230.)
In approximately 2005, the City added an additional component to the user fees with
respect to its residents' water and sewer usage. That component of the water and sewer user
was a "Return on Equity" or "Rate of Return" component. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 342-346.)
Additionally, in approximately 2007, after consulting with, and receiving studies from, Red Oak
Consulting, the City established its connection/capacity fee, which is a one-time only fee

(R.

assessed to builders of new construction

connections to the

fee was designed to cover the cost
The user fee and connection/capacity

1, pp. 122;

.)

connection/capacity
1, pp. 122; 701.)

were separate and distinct fees and were not calculated

the same manner. (R. Vol. 1,p. 701.)
In approximately 2011, Respondent re-labeled its "Return on Equity" or "Rate
component as a Payment-In-Lieu- Of-Taxes. (R. Vol. 1, p. 701.)
user fee was calculated on the prior year city

tax levy rate multiplied by the estimated

most recent financial

an

701.) The rate ofreturn was
set

year and approved by the

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -

component of

rates were

1,

user

wastewater
1,

user

present litigation originated with the case, Building Contractors Association of

Southeast Idaho v.

1,

l-52280C. (R.

of Pocatello,

pp. 11-18; R. Resp. Supp. pp. 842-869.) In that case, the City admitted that the PILOT
component was essentially a tax, which was levied against water and sewer system users and
then transferred from the water and sewer funds to

City's general fund. (R. Vol. 1, p. 160.) In

establishing this system, the City relied upon a prior Idaho Supreme Court decision in City of

Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 1

Idaho 198, 899 P .2d 411 (1995),

determined it was permissible to charge such a fee
1,pp.11

(R.

which the Idaho Supreme

funds were transferred to a
was

51.)

same fashion as a

1,

(R.

701.)

component was only associated with the user fees and had no-~•~._.,._ the one-time
(R. Vol. 1,

connection/capacity

Building Contractors,
the

component

that case,
.. ~...·~-· of issues.

the user

35-36.)
plaintiffs asserted

violated the Idaho Revenue Bond

district court concluded in
Resp. Supp.,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -

both the connection/capacity

868.) Specifically,

and the Idaho

had

on a

court found as follows:

Through the use of the
transfer program, or any
program with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on
equity program, the
declares that the City is imposing an impermissible
tax to the extent that connection and user
are being assessed a PILOT
general fond purposes, a..t1d such practices must cease and are hereby
enjoined because they are unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act. This means that connection and user fees must be
adjusted to the extent that they include a charge for the PILOT fee.
addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer account to the
general fond are permitted.
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred
from the water and sewer accounts to the general fond, through any
appropriate process, however named, for the purpose of paying expenses
related to the operation, maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of
existing water and sewer systems, including only those general City expenses
needed to operate the water and sewer departments, such as HR, financial,
legal and accounting, such transfers are permitted and are not hereby enjoined.
(R. Resp. Supp., p. 868.)
the
decision

Building

the

fee and therefore each of the

fee was impermissible

part,

immediately discontinued charging

resident users saw an immediate decrease

water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 20 l

the City lowered

user fees in

compliance with the Building Contractors decision. Pocatello residents saw an approximately
10%

their monthly water and wastewater

Vol. 1,

the City made no changes to the connection/capacity fee after the court's
decision in Building Contractors, where that fee was found to be appropriate. (R. Vol. 1,

37.)

and the two
no relationship. Based on
was
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6

Building
amount was -"''"-·~·

connection/capacity
868.)

the
and

state law equitable estoppel and/or equitable tolling.
The district court

granted summary

Appellants' claims, concluding that the
that

claim

1,

8.)

case and dismissed

has immunity

Appellants' state law claims and

an unconstitutional taking fails because there is no compensable property
summary judgment

interest Appellants now appeal seeking to challenge the district
decision. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 802-805.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
court

a grant

standard

a

summary judgment de novo.

is the same as the standard

(2003). Disputed facts

court

ofIdaho, 138 Idaho

summary judgment." Purdy v. Farmers

the matter must be construed

favor

any, show

is no genuine

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

1

445,65

186

non-moving party, and

"summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and
with the affidavits,

novo

on file, together

as to any material fact and that the

ofBecker

Callahan, 140

525,96
courts engage
regarding whether

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -

district court

)

a mree--sre:n

as one of

an

I.

CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE PILOT
CITY OF POCATELLO DID NOT CONSTITUTE A
TAKING BECAUSE THE PAYMENT OF MONEY DOES NOT AMOUNT TO
COMPENSABLE PRIVATE PROPERTY INTEREST UNDER
ANALYSIS.
determined that

taking because fungible money, unlike real and

fee charged to users was not a
personal property, does not meet the

definition of a compensable private property interest under a takings analysis. Appellants have
alleged an unconstitutional taking under both
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
identical.

Idaho State and United States Constitution and

analysis for either a federal or state takings claim is

State Constitution and the

Amendment

States

not be
art. I, § l
requires a two-step analysis.
Lucas v. South

Coastal

505

Kaiser Aetna v. US.,

1

1014, 112

l 79-180, 100

a plaintiff

383,

just compensation. See Short v. US, 50 F.3d 994, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
were unable to establish a
dismissed Appellants' claim

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

property
a taking. Moreover, even if

this case, Appellants
court therefore

not

court
compensation.

Appellants contend that the PILOT component
United States
contention is misplaced. Generally, taxation is not considered to

a taking because the uR,uu,,,

paid are not a recognizable protected property interest See, e.g., United States v. Sperry
493 U.S. 52,

107 L.Ed2d 290

110 S.Ct.

1

)

1986)

to "achieve through special taxes what

Amendment forbids

Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895

done

money to be spent is not a taking of

1990)

United States,

a taking);

not

a

68,
Government

a

is not a taking); Commercial Builders v.

a settlement

user

989) (holding that a deduction

Fed.

(2000) ("Requiring money to

property"); Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1

Commonwealth Edison
spent is not a taking

1, 1576 (Fed.Cir. 1995)

argument

that a federal statute constituted a taking, "because
why a takings analysis
v. United

18 (1
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9

not

an assessment
1995), cert.

V.

519

81

117

at
cases

lS

can be a taking, Appellants' claim
same reasoning in

a tax

an unconstitutional taking fails. Moreover, this Court

Investments,

v. State, 138 Idaho

(2003). There, when determining whether the state's liquor license transfer fee constituted a
taking, this

determined there was no compensable property interest, quoting the California

Supreme Court's reasoning that "the taking of money is

real or personal property." Id. at 355 (quoting San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City And

from the taking

ofSanFrancisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643,
lS

under the Fifth Amendment,

nrr,n<>M"U

l 06 (2002)). Although it is undisputed that

1, 41

federal and state case

not
not constitute a

the takings analysis.
compensable property interest
this case,
Respondent. Once the District

takings analysis.
component

user

held that

was

collected by

component was unconstitutional
immediately ceased

that its collection must cease, the Respondent complied with this
water

sewer user

case centers on the collection of money, guidance from
can even
taking under either

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -

a

Court and various federal courts on
1s no

for a

court

that Respondent lacked

f ' r u...c,.r,1-1

~n,-h~-.-. to -~•-•v-, user fees

was wholly

upon BHA Investments, Inc. v.

IF')

an

Idaho 168, 1

of Boise,

attempt to argue that the PILOT fee was a taking because Respondent

lacked authority to collect user fees as was the case
Boise's collection of a liquor license transfer
to charge such a

BHA II. However, in BHA II the City

was improper, where the city lacked authority

Id. That case was distinguished from its prior sister case BHA Investments,

Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 63
police

P.3d 315 (2004)

nA'IYTA·rc

474 (2003)

where

state did have

to charge

unlike in BHA I,

was a taking, where

had no
collection

BHAI,
state

to

f>hn.-no

a liquor Hv•~H~>v

authority under its police powers to establish fees with

respect to liquor licenses.
Appellants' reliance on BHA II is .,,,,,._,,.A_,,.,,..,, where this
premise that the

of Boise had no authority to

fees

was

II,

the City of Boise lacked any authority to impose
to charge

Respondent clearly

residents a user fee with respect to water
to
or

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF· l

case.

sewer

necessary
1,

as

court appropriately

revenue.

Appellants' takings claim under both the Idaho

United State

Constitution.

C.

Appellants' attempt to distinguish a tax from a fee and whether payment was made under
protest is irrelevant as it confuses the proper takings analysis with an inapplicable statute
of limitations analysis.
Appellants go to great lengths in their brief to show that the district court somehow

mislabeled the PILOT component as a

rather than a "fee," indicating that such a

misidentification would change the takings analysis. While such a misidentification is
to whether there is a compensable private property interest, Idaho case
is truly a tax whenever it

not bear a reasonable

as

demonstrates that a
to

to

ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502,504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1988).

.... " Brewster v.

recently conducted an analysis regarding the distinction between

question

the United States District

re Certified

and taxes

4). There, this

Question ofLaw, 156 Idaho 77, 82, 320 P .3d 1236, 1241

Court

considered a

the District

a

narrowly tailored question regarding the commencement

statute

statutory

remedies made available under Idaho law to

an illegal county tax."

at 80.

Because the parties used the terms

a refund

and "tax" interchangeably in their briefing,

Court

to acknowledge

at
RESPONDENT'S BRJEF

tax.

can

statement to

it
statute

limitations begins to run

statutory remedies

Appellants' unsupported

statement

takings analysis. On its face, this Court's statement stands

Idaho law. Id.
not clarify anything
the proposition that a

is a fee

when it is legitimate, and it is a "tax" when it serves the purposes of a tax but was disguised as a
fee.
its imposition "does

services constitutes a disguised tax
not

a reasonable relationship to services to
Idaho 168, 176, 108

31

2002), a tax was

Investments, Inc. v.

323 (2004) (citing Brewster v.

(1988)). For instance,
F.3d 1

provided. . ."

United

of Pocatello, 115

296

Show

on commercial cargo

United States Supreme
approximation

services, facilities, or benefits furnished to exporters, and

not

as a permissible user fee. Id. at 1381

Corp.,

U.S. 360, 363, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 140 ,..,.,_, ..........

United States
determining whether the

user
personal property, ·-··-..v·

or
not amount to

takings analysis and

a

as a tax or

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -

a

to

not

a

a taking.

court

Here, Plaintiffs must first establish they have a compensable property interest to
complete the takings analysis. According to federal law, regardless of what
grounds the determination is made upon, Plaintiffs' claim fails at this step
because the Takings Clause is not implicated by the collection of a tax. This Court
recognizes that the tax here, the PILOT component to the user fees, was previously
held to be impermissible. However, a tax, even an impermissible tax, is still a tax.
The same laws and standards apply to a governmental-imposed obligation to
pay money, even one found to be impermissible.
Vol. 1, p. 714.) (emphasis added). Although it was labeled a fee, the PILOT component was a
tax because it did not bear a reasonable relationship to the services provided by Respondent
as in United States Show Corp. and many other cases cited herein, regardless of the
PILOT component's classification, it was a

of money that, although constituting

property, does not amount to a compensable property interest within the takings analysis. Thus,
because the PILOT component of the user fee was a payment of money, it cannot establish a
taking, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Appellants'
takings claim.
prior to this current litigation, the district court in Building Contractors
determined that the PILOT component

the user fee was a "tax".

Appellants' attempt to challenge that determination
failed to

VoL I, pp. 1

this case is inappropriate. Appellants

the decision in Building

case.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 14

l

the
a tax was

are

THERE WAS NO DISPUTED MATERIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN
ARGUMENT THAT RESPONDENT ACTED WITH MALICE AND RECKLESS,
WILLFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT.
district court correctly determined that when construed

a light most favorable to
with

malice and reckless, wi1lful and wanton conduct AppeIIants have alleged three state law causes
of action relating to the collection of the

component: (1) unconstitutional taking under the

Idaho Constitution, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) equitable estoppel and/or equitable tolling.
district court determined that Respondent is immune

these claims pursuant to Idaho

must determine:
... whether tort recovery is allowed under
laws of Idaho; and,
if so, whether an exception to liability found in the tort claims act
shields the alleged misconduct from liability; and, if no exception
applies, whether the merits of the claim as presented for
consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle the
moving party to dismissal.

v. State Dep't ofHealth & Welfare, 1
it is true

a

295,298,847

1156, 1159 (1

IS

conduct, a governmental

may qualify

exceptions to

)
IS

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15

not

§

IS

governmental
course and
of their
,u,,,,~. intent and without reckless, willful and wanton
as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for
claim which:
1. Arises out of the assessment or collection

any tax or fee.

§ 6-904A(l) (emphasis added).
When considering whether a governmental entity's conduct
provided

within the immunity

Idaho Code § 6-904A(l ), a court looks to whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient

evidence to show both "malice" and "reckless,

wanton conduct Idaho Code §

provides

and wanton conduct" by stating such

is present

and

creating unreasonable risk
that such harm will

to another,

Anderson v.

a high

" On the other hand, the term

Idaho Tort Claims Act Although the statute does not
meanmg

does or

to do an act
of probability

is statutorily undefined
"malice," this Court analyzed

ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731

986).

this

stated:

generally
term malice has
Malice,§
1. At a minimum, malice involves the intentional commission of a wrongful or
unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was
intended. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485-86,
S.Ct 505, 508, 48
(1903). This is
to as "legal" malice. 52
Malice, § 1. However,
the phrase "without malice or criminal

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16

intentional commission
u,u,uvu or excuse and with ill will,
added). The term
comrn1ss10n
1

Idaho 71

intent" has also

what the person

to be a

defined

this

James v. City ofBoise,

351 P.3d 1171, 1188 (2015), reh'g denied (June 19,201

reh'g denied

(July 20, 201
In this case,

is no evidence that

reckless, willful and wanton conduct
Appellants'

acted with malice or criminal intent
the collection of the

"the court

no analysis as to whether there was

district court

Memorandum
1 pp. 788-791.)

and wanton conduct.

Appellants had

argument was not raised until after the district court

to present any evidence that Respondent acted with malice,

Interestingly, in

briefing to this

Appellants neglect to provide any kind
argue

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

as

as

to

wanton
the

user

an

v,_,, ..,__,.,,

component would likely improperly
Attorney

0

''°''""1-" revenue. Appellants'

11
"'

s opinion to show a genuine

of material

IS

Attorney General Opinions are considered advisory only and are not binding authority. See

v. White, 1

Idaho 907,915, 762 P.2d 820,828 (1988); Sandpoint Convalescent

Services, Inc. v. Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare, 114 Idaho 281, 283, n. 4, 756
398, 400, n. 4 (1988); Holly Care
51 (1986).

State, Dep't ofEmployment, 110 Idaho 76, 82, 714 P .2d

Attorney General's opinion even confirms that

1 pp. 137; 790.) Respondent

and were an "informal and unofficial response."
was

entitled to disagree

authority found

Attorney

letters were merely an

Opinion and

of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P .2d 411

noted by the district court, the Respondent

995).

upon what it perceived to be compatible

of Chubbuck v. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P .2d 411 (1995), before

law,
initiating the

component.

I,

71

Although

district court distinguished

the Building Contractors case, reliance on City of Chubbuck
cannot

an
intent.

property taxes lower. (R.
nrr,nPrnr

component was

undisputed evidence indicates

taxes
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1,

103; 1
an act

1

vu,,,., ...,..,

It defies logic to suggest that

out

or criminal

to keep

attempt to

court

assert

conduct. It is

Appellants filed
new because although

motion for reconsideration. Even then,
had not raised them in this litigation,

destruction of evidence were raised
Resp. Supp., pp.

arguments were not
-·~"""u

spoliation

the Building Contractors case and adjudicated

(R.

this case, Appellants never filed a ....,..~... to compel

never raised a concern about spoliation until after summary judgment
Respondent has not withheld

matter, and

been granted.

is no basis for
matter.

Building Contractors briefing, the
consistent with Respondent's document retention
the Building Contractors matter
Respondent's

vv,."'"'"'

Thus, _rici,v'-,"""""
),
Appellants' state

BRIEF-

overcome
claims

presumption
m

§

AND REASONABLE
RETROACTIVITY OF
The district court

not abuse its
issue of retro activity has no real

bearing on this case,

no legal basis

for

district court exercised its sound discretion to confirm that Respondent was to cease charging the
component of the user

"going forward. Retroactive application of past and pending

cases, even to the case in which the decision was announced is not mandatory and is left to the
sound discretion

the court. BHA Investments Inc. v. City ofBoise, 1

P .3d 315, 320 (2004).

Idaho 168 173, 108

considering whether to apply a case retroactively, courts are to

exercise discretion

balancing three key factors: (1) the purpose of the decision;
and

the

if the

upon the

(citing Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 1

applied

523

IS

1365 (1974)).

first factor against the second and third factors to determine whether to

Courts should balance

retroactive application of the decision. Id. ( citing

v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d

284 (1977)).
this case, Appellants primarily argue that only appellate courts have discretion to
application of a decision or

BHA Investments,

98

606,570

V.

this

to

ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P .3d 315 (2004) and Jones v.
both

cases the
"this

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

at 1

to

It is
""'L'" .. '"''"

Court to

to limit a decision's retroactive application, that it is the
Indeed, it is

balancing the key retroactivity factors,

declared, "[ a ]pp lying these principles, this court concludes that
decision in

such

its discretion

Watson. See Jones, 98 Idaho at 609. There,

applying

it

states

trial court ruled correctly in

v. Javelin prospectively. Id. (emphasis added). There is no validity

to Appellants' argument that a district court cannot apply a case it decided prospectively. While
it is true the Idaho Supreme Court has the ultimate responsibility to confirm whether a
court was correct

its application, BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise does not
Idaho

can

that the district court has the
and the Idaho Supreme
district court does not

it

prospective

to make a determination of prospective

has the ability to
the ability to

the

such determinations.

suggest that

·-"·""'- whether a case is

IS

and represents a severe misstatement of the
the

court correctly perceived

as one
not

A discretionary decision
as the

court should not
issue as one
an

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -

so

31,

121

1

court (citing

Investments,

715.)

applied

weighing

correct

the key factors for determining whether a decision should apply retroactively. In doing so, the
district court reasonably concluded that although Respondent incorrectly relied on prior case
the purpose of the Building Contractors decision was to prevent the PILOT component from being
assessed in the future. (R. Vol. L, p. 716.)
Moreover, the district court expressed reasonable concerns that residents of Pocatello
would be adversely affected if the Building Contractors decision were applied retroactively, where
costly financial and human resources would be required to determine recovery amounts and
"applying the decision retroactively would

require collection

fees from the very

customers (in many cases) who would be receiving those fees back."

1 p. 71

Significantly, the district court further reasoned that the purpose of the Building Contractors case
(R. VoL 1., p. 71

was accomplished because the PILOT component was no longer

if the Building Contractors decision

Indeed, the administration of justice would not
was applied retroactively.

retroactively apply

Building Contractors case would

administration of justice because Respondent would be forced to expend significant financial and
amount
user. Furthermore, each property owner
mcrease

Ve<.. un,,'U

City

TAr,r-An

to

to shoulder a large

their property taxes to sustain a damage award given the PILOT component was
Respondent in its annual

RESPONDENT'S BR1EF

court

it

1.,
Finally, it is important to note that

court did not even

to

a

determination to apply Building Contractors prospectively because, not only was
done by the

language pronounced in the Building

already

decision, such a

determination was irrelevant where each of Appellants' claims was already being decided on
their merits. Ultimately, because it properly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within
the bounds of such discretion, and came to a reasonable conclusion, the district court did not abuse
its discretion with respect to applying the Building Contractors case prospectively.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED POTENTIAL HARM FROM ALL
PERSPECTIVES AND DID NOT IMPROPERLY DISREGARD EVIDENCE OF
ADVERSE EFFECTS UPON APPELLANTS.
Appellants make the unsupportable and conclusory statement that the district court

ignored or disregarded claims of "serious
the PILOT component.

to Appellants if they are not allowed to recover

is no foundation for the argument that the district court did not

fully and appropriately consider all aspects of the PILOT component's repayment Respondent
provided the district court with evidence regarding how an award

damages would be
damage

calculated
would be paid by increased property taxes born

property owners in

pp. 446-449.) The district court recognized this, acknowledging

as
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as

(R. Vol. 1.,

customers

substantial
718.)

a probable

making

on

a statement, it is apparent that the district court analyzed the potential

burdens associated with repayment

the

component

all angles, including the

claimed harms to Appellants.
Any claim of substantial harm to Appellants is disingenuous. As a result of the PILOT
component's repayment, Appellant

Mobile Home, as a property owner in the

would

recovery. Thus, any
claim that Appellants as rate payers suffered a serious and substantial harm is without
foundation. Rather,

evidence in the record is that an award of damages would

substantial, negative effect on individuals such as

owner of

Mobile

a

through

not improperly disregard evidence of unjust ramifications that Appellants would suffer if they
did not recover the PILOT component.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT, WHERE THE
MOTION WAS UNTIMELY AND WOULD LIKELY CAUSE UNDUE DELAY.
The district court did not err in declining to consider Appellants' arguments pertaining to
Respondent's alleged improper spending of the connection and/or capacity fees, where such
outside the scope

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 24

court

not

prejudice, and validity

claim." (R.

731.)
not

so

as

district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the bounds of
such discretion, and (3) reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason. Easterling v. Kendall,
159 Idaho 902,367 P.3d 1214, 1

m

1 (2016), reh'g denied (Mar. 31, 2016). First, the district court

case clearly perceived the issue as one of discretion, where it expressly stated

its

summary judgment decision that the "district court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to
amend a pleading." (R. Vol. 1.,
citing to

726.) Additionally, the district court applied the proper rule,

15(a) governing amendment of pleadings

analysis of Rule 15(a)

Carl

considering this

Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993

1197 (1999). (R. Vol. 1., p. 726.) 1n that case, this Court declared:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith
or amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party
virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment,
sought should, as the rules require, be freely given.
at 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993
182 ( 1962) ( emphasis added)).

F oman factors
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1197, 1202 (1999) (quotingFoman v.

1 U.S. 178,

that case, this Court further stated, "timeliness is
delay,

and

to

Id.

~-··~···" •.. ~.,·~··to ain1ena ~··~-·have been filed by February 17, 2015 to be tiinely but was not

June 12, 2015 after

substantial work had been coinpleted on briefing to the court on "'"'''""= judgment (R Vol. 1.,
p. 728.) Ultiinately, the district court reasoned that an ainendinent at such a late stage in the
process would cause further unnecessary delay after substantial work had been done on the case,
and where the validity of the claiins was questionable. Because Appellants' claiins of iinproper
spending of the connection and/or capacity fees were not initially pled,

the district court

reasonably exercised its discretion in denying Appellants' Inotion to ainend, the district court did
not err in declining to consider such claiins.

ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Respondent seeks an award of attorney fees and
costs in accordance with Idaho Code§ 12-117 and/or Idaho Code§ 6-918. Section 1 117
provides for a municipal entity to recover attorney fees when

party against whoin the
6-918 provides

judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."

an award of costs and fees where the prevailing party demonstrates "by clear and convincing
against

or

such award is sought was

the coillillencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action." Idaho Code §
sections
as

appeal has

that a County is entitled to an award
brought
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8A.

fees on appeal inasmuch
or law.

a

§ 1988.
a

court misapplied the law.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Respondent City of Pocatello respectfully requests that
affirm the district court's decision granting summary judgment on
dismissing Appellants' Complaint with prejudice.
Dated this

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF· 27

ofNovember, 2016.

claims and

PA

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485
Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
524-3391
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